A human being who phenomenologically reduces his possibilities to the saeculum—that is, to the purely human horizon of history lived within a non‑transcendent framework—constitutes himself through a pure possibility of being. It is striking to observe how two thinkers, distant from one another in time, space, and culture, nonetheless converge on this same constitutive dimension of the human, each through his own terminology.
Heidegger. For Heidegger, being‑there (Dasein) is potentiality because, for as long as it exists, it inherently includes what‑is‑not‑yet (zum Dasein, solange es ist, dieses Noch‑nicht gehört — Sein und Zeit §48, 242).
Leopardi. And what does Leopardi say about desire? “Quella vita ch’è una cosa bella, non è la vita che si conosce, ma quella che non si conosce; non la vita passata, ma la futura.” (“That life which is a beautiful thing is not the life that is known, but the one that is unknown; not the past life, but the future.” — Dialogo di un venditore d’almanacchi e di un passeggere, Operette morali, 480–81.)
Leopardi’s notion of desire and Heidegger’s constitutive possibility of being‑there seem remarkably close. Is it not perhaps intrinsic to the human condition to desire—to yearn for something that is never what one would wish it to be, and that, precisely for this reason, constitutes us in our being‑in‑the‑world?
Desire (for pleasure) is structurally constitutive of the human being (Dasein), for in the individual it ceases only with death. “Il detto desiderio del piacere non ha limiti per durata, perché, come ho detto, non finisce se non coll’esistenza… Non ha limiti per estensione perché è sostanziale in noi.” (“This desire for pleasure has no limits in duration, because, as I said, it does not end except with existence… It has no limits in extent because it is substantial in us.” — Operette morali, 165.)
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